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PATENTS - VALIDITY OF LETTERS PATENT - LICENSEE
ESTOPPEL TO DISPUTE VALIDITY
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
There exists a strong federal policy manifested in patent law for
preserving free and open competition in unpatented and unpatent-
able inventions.1 In furtherance of this objective, federal courts
favor the exposure of worthless patents in order to relieve the pub-
lic from their burdensome effects on the economy.' Ironically, the
doctrine of licensee estoppel3 though deeply embedded in patent
law seems to have thwarted both of these aims by precluding a li-
censee from challenging the validity of a patent. As recent Supreme
Court decisions reemphasize the federal policy favoring free com-
petition in unpatented ideas,4 the divergence between policy and a
1 A patent is a statutory grant of a limited monopoly giving the patentee "the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention" for a term of 17 years.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). See U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 8. The fact that a patent is
only temporary and must meet strict standards in order to be granted reflects an under-
lying philosophy and purpose of the patent system once expressed by Thomas Jefferson,
an administrator of the patent system and the author of the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,
1 Stat. 318:
That ideas should be freely spread from one another over the globe for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition,
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature.... In-
ventions then cannot, in nature, be subject to property. Society may give an
exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to pur-
sue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, ac-
cording to the will and convenience of society . . . . Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, August 1813, published in VI WRurnNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180-81 (Washington ed. 1854).
See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); Pennock v. Dia-
logue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 8 (1829).
2 See Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400-01,
rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 853 (1947); cf. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224,
234 (1892).
3 For a comprehensive treatment of the historical development and theoretical bases
of the estoppel doctrine, see Cooper, Estoppel to Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of
Private Good Faith v. Public Policy, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1122 (1967); Kramer, Estop-
pel to Deny Validity - A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 237 (1968); Treece,
Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1967). See
generally R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS & LICENSES §§ 140-45, 692-709, at 165-73,
725-43 (2d ed. 1936).
4 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied,
377 U.S. 913 (1964). Neither of these cases involved licensee estoppel. Instead, they
held that since unpatented articles or designs belong to the public, a state may not grant
an injunction against, or award damages for, copying such products without conflicting
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rule of law has become more pronounced. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,5 pre-
sented the Court with an opportunity to reassess the vitality and the
underlying validity of the estoppel doctrine.6 In both respects the
Court found the venerable rule wanting.
While employed by the Lear aviation company, John Adkins,
an inventor and mechanical engineer, developed a low-cost method
of producing gyroscopes. To protect the rights to his ideas,7 the
inventor filed an application with the Patent Office in 1954.
Shortly thereafter, the parties drafted a licensing agreement under
which Lear promised to pay royalties in return for the use of Ad-
kins' invention in the manufacturing process. But in 1957, Lear
ceased its royalty payments on the gyros then being produced.8
Upon the issuance of the patent in 1960,' Adkins sought recovery
in the California courts for breach of the licensing agreement."
with the exclusive power of the federal government to grant patents to only true inven-
tions. Accord, Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 515,
522 (1964) (Black, Douglas, and Clark, J.J., and Warren, C.J., dissenting): "When
articles are not patentable and therefore are in the public domain ... to grant them a
legally protected monopoly offends the constitutional plan of a competitive economy
free from patent monopolies except where there are patentable 'Discoveries.' " (empha-
sis added).
5 395 U.S. 653 (1969). For a criticism of the Court's analysis of licensee estop-
pel, see Dodds, After Lear v. Adkins - What?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 621 (1969).
6 The estoppel doctrine was last upheld in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
7 Until a patent is issued, an inventor does not have an exclusive right to a new and
useful invention, nor can he maintain an action for infringement of his idea. Gayler v.
Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 476, 492 (1850).
8 In 1957, Lear decided that a prior patent had anticipated Adkins' invention and
terminated the royalties on the gyros being manufactured in Michigan; 2 years later,
royalties on the gyros produced in California were also discontinued. However, the
contract agreement stipulated only three conditions by which Lear could terminate its
royalties and the licensing agreement: (1) Lear's discontinuance of the use of Adkins'
invention upon 90 days prior notice; (2) the Patent Office's refusal to issue a patent
on the substantial claims in the patent application; (3) subsequent invalidation of a
patent issued on the invention. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 897, 435 P.2d
321, 329, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 553 (1967).
9 It was not unusual in the 1950's for the Patent Office to take over 3 years to render
a final decision on the patentability of an invention. In addition to the inconvenience
for the applicant, such delays often caused others working in the same field or on the
same invention a serious loss of engineering time and money, since the Patent Office
holds all applications in confidence until a final determination is made. 35 U.S.C.
§ 122 (1964); 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (a) (1960). See Bryant, The Patent Mess, 66 FOR-
TUNE, Sept. 1962, at 111, 113.
10 The Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. § I (1964), has no provision for the licensing of
patents. Rather, license agreements are a creature of common law and are governed by
general principles of contract law. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S.
315 (1888); L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), aff'd, 118 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 653 (1941). Con-
troversies regarding licensing contracts, e.g., actions to set aside, to specifically enforce,
or to recover royalties, cannot be maintained in federal court, absent diversity of citizen-
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Concluding that the company was liable for the royalties under the
license contract, the California Supreme Court held that the doc-
trine of licensee estoppel foreclosed Lear from challenging the
validity of the patent.1
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
determination of the patent's validity, overruling the licensee estop-
pel doctrine as no longer sound in light of the national policy favor-
ing free competition in unpatentable ideas. 2 The Court further
held that, until the state court determined the validity of Adkins'
patent, Lear's royalty obligations were suspended.3
The estoppel doctrine is neither statutory nor is it an offspring
of the policies underlying patent law. Instead, it has a judicial
heritage whose genesis is in equity and the common law of con-
tracts. 4  A licensee's orthodox defense in a suit for royalties had
ship, because they do not arise under federal patent law. E.g., Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
270 U.S. 496, 502, 510 (1926). See also Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388,
390-91 (1929); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897), which
hold that state courts may determine questions arising under patent law, such as the
validity of a patent, which are collateral to the main issue before the court. See generally
Hilton, Federal and State Court Competency To Adjudicate Cases Involving Patent
Rights, 36 CONN. BJ. 281 (1962).
The opinions of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are reported re-
spectively in Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 53 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964), and in Adkins
v. Lear, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1967). But for a summary of the decisions and their
underlying rationale, see 395 U.S. at 660-61 (1969). Lear had sought to shortcut the
proceedings in the California courts by filing a declaratory judgment action to determine
the patent's validity in a federal court, but the action was stayed pending a final deter-
mination in the state courts. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
1167 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
12 395 U.S. at 671.
i ld. at 674. While concurring in the overruling of the estoppel doctrine, Mr.
Justice White questioned the Court's jurisdiction in this particular case to decide whether
"federal law overrode state contract law and precluded collection of the royalties which
Lear had promised to pay." Id. at 677, 679 (concurring opinion). Lear had not raised
the royalty issue as a defense in the lower courts nor had the California Supreme Court
rendered a final judgment on it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964), which gives the Su-
preme Court jurisdiction to review final judgments by the highest court of a state in-
volving federal rights.
14 Some courts have analogized licensee estoppel to an estoppel applied in the land-
lord-tenant relationship, which itself rests on contract principles. See, e.g., Barber As-
phalt Paving Co. v. Headley Good Roads Co., 284 F. 177, 179 (D. Del. 1922), affd,
292 F. 119 (3d Cir. 1923); Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (No. 17,647) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1846); Lanova Corp. v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 44 Del. 55, 63, 55 A.2d
272, 275 (1947); Davis Co. v. Burnsville Hosiery Mills, Inc., 242 N.C. 718, 720, 89
S.E.2d 410, 412 (1955). It is a general rule that a tenant may not dispute a landlord's
title in a suit for rent. 3A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1255, at 302 (J. Grimes
replacement ed. 1959). A lease entitles a tenant to quiet enjoyment of the premises,
free from interference by the landlord. Having thus benefited from the undisturbed
use of the premises, the lessee may not challenge the lessor's title. By analogy, where a
licensee enjoys the use of a patented invention, without interference from its owner, he
is estopped from attacking the validity of the parent. In either case, the obligations and
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been that his performance was excused because an invalid patent
was tantamount to a failure of consideration. 5 The estoppel rule
precluded such a challenge, for the courts perceived a number of
bargained-for benefits flowing to the licensee sufficient to enforce
a royalty obligation. An exclusive patent license gives to a licensee
an exclusive privilege to manufacture, use, or sell an invention,
plus a right to the economic gain incident to such a monopoly. 6
The licensor suffers a corresponding detriment in that he relin-
quishes both his right to license others and the opportunity to ex-
ploit the patent himself. On the other hand, a licensee under a
non-exclusive agreement receives at the very least a patentee's
waiver of his right to sue for infringement; 1 here too, the licensee
gains competitive benefits to the extent that a patentee bars others
from using his invention.18
The Supreme Court has never delineated a precise basis for the
estoppel doctrine,'" yet throughout the decades it has often re-
ceived the Court's uncritical acclaim. The rule gained acceptance
as early as 1855 in Kinsman v. Parkhurst,2° where the estoppel doc-
trine was applied against an assignee. 2' The patentee had assigned
an interest in his patent to a manufacturer in return for a share of
the profits from sales of the invention. Sued in equity to account
for the profits, the assignee objected to the patent's validity. Rely-
ing on the estoppel doctrine, the Court held that the "invalidity of
benefits are derived directly from the contractual relationship, not the title to the prop-
erty.
15See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1255 (1962).
16 See, e.g., Headley Good Roads Co. v. Barber Asphalt Co., 292 F. 119 (3d Cir.
1923); Angier v. Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co., 98 Pa. 594, 600 (1881); Marston v.
Swett, 60 N.Y. 206 (1876).
17 Bowers Mfg. Co. v. All-Steel Equip., Inc., 275 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 812 (1960). A patentee may bring either an action at law for damages for
infringement or a suit in equity to enjoin the infringer. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283 (1964).
18Between 1952 and 1958, Lear operated under an exclusive, prepatent license
which enabled the company to gain a competitive edge over other manufacturers. After
1958, Lear exercised its election to permit the license to become nonexdusive. Brief for
Respondent at 58, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
19 Cooper, supra note 3, at 1128.
20 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
21 Both a patent and an application for a patent may be assigned. 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1964). A license is distinguished from an assignment in that the latter involves the
transfer of the entire interest, or an undivided portion of the entire interest, in the ex-
clusive patent right. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891). A license
passes no legal or equitable rights in the monopoly, but is a mere permission granted by
the patentee to make, sell, or use the invention. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 24
(1912). However, in terms of contract law, both the assignee and the licensee may be
obligated to compensate the assignor or licensor for the benefits received from the patent
monopoly, irrespective of its validity.
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the patent does not render the sales of the machine illegal, so as to
taint with illegality the obligation of the [assignees] to account. 22
In other words, the validity of a patent was irrelevant to the as-
signor's contractual duty to share the profits. The Court upheld the
estoppel doctrine as against licensees in United States v. Harvey
Steel Co. 23  A license contract between a patentee and the United
States provided that the latter would be relieved of its royalty obli-
gations only upon an adjudication of the patent's invalidity. Find-
ing that this provision was inserted in the contract in reliance upon
the licensee estoppel doctrine, the Court deduced that the licensee
itself could not raise the validity issue to trigger the proviso. The
absence of any critical analysis by the Harvey Court of the justifi-
cations for the estoppel doctrine is noteworthy. This blind adher-
ence to the estoppel rule was subsequently mirrored in Automatic
Radio Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,24 which acknowledged the
doctrine of licensee estoppel as the "general rule"25 and foreclosed
the licensee of radio broadcasting apparatus from challenging the
validity of the underlying patents in a suit for royalties.
However, amid these reaffirmations of the estoppel doctrine,
the Supreme Court has chiselled away numerous exceptions and
limitations until there remained only a broken skeleton.26  The first
major exception to the estoppel doctrine was the notion that in de-
fending an infringement charge an assignor could introduce evi-
dence as to the prior state of the art to qualify the coverage of the
patent claims. 7 The estoppel principle suffered further erosion
2259 U.S. (18 How.) at 393.
23196 U.S. 310 (1905).
24339 U.S. 827 (1950).
251d. at 836.
26 Even before the Harvey case, the estoppel doctrine had yielded to the demands of
public policy. In Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892), the Court denied
enforcement of a licensee's contractual promise never to contest the validity of a patent,
noting the importance "to the public that competition should not be repressed by worth-
less patents." Id. at 234.
27 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924).
Assignor estoppel arises in infringement suits where the assignee charges the as-
signor with infringing a patent right originally owned by the latter. This rule devel-
oped alongside licensee estoppel, although the justifications were somewhat different.
One reason for estopping the assignor has been to prevent unfairness and injustice.
Thus, in Faulks v. Kamp, 3 F. 898 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880), the court thought it unfair
and unjust to allow an assignor to sell a patent for valuable consideration, then to de-
feat the full enjoyment of the patent by proving what he had sold was worthless. Some
courts have drawn the analogy to an estoppel by deed in property law. Just as a grantor
of land is estopped from derogating the title passed to the grantee, so also fair dealing
forecloses the assignor from discrediting the conveyed interest. See, e.g., Foltz Smoke-
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when it was held that an assignor could defend an infringement
claim by showing that he was actually operating under an expired
patent.28
The estoppel doctrine yielded not only to policies expressed in
the patent laws but also to federal antitrust policy against unlawful
monopolies. Licensee estoppel has been held inapplicable where
licensing agreements contained provisions in potential conflict with
less Furnace Co. v. Eureka Smokeless Furnace Co., 256 F. 847, 848 (7th Cir. 1919);
Chicago & A. Ry. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1917).
In Westinghouse Electric, supra, an assignee of a patent for making electrical insu-
lation sued the assignor for patent infringement. The Court held that the assignment
contract estopped the assignor from denying the legality of the patent. However, in
defending the charge of infringement, the assignor was allowed to introduce evidence
of the prior state of the art to narrow or qualify, but not extinguish altogether, coverage
of the patent claims. The Court concluded that examination of the prior art provided
"the most satisfactory means of measuring the extent of the grant the government in-
tended." 266 U.S. at 350. Presumably, the purpose of such a determination is to avoid
penalizing the public for using an invention or ideas not meriting patent protection,
though the Court did not express itself in these terms.
It should be noted that claims and specifications of every patent must be read in
light of the state of the prior art when it was issued. Dillon Co. v. Continental Supply
Co., 98 F.2d 581, 588 (10th Cir. 1938). Where a patent daim is not novel, relative
to the state of the art, it cannot be given effect and does not entitle the patentee to a
further, exclusive right to it.
28 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). An employee of
the Scott Paper Company had assigned to the company his patent to a method and a
machine for applying cutting edges to boxes of rolled waxed paper. Subsequently, the
employee left the company and organized his own business which produced boxes hav-
ing the same cutting edge. When the Scott company sued for infringement, the as-
signor alleged that the invention used to make the boxes was a copy of a machine
whose patent had expired and thus was now dedicated to the public use.
The impact of the Scott opinion is akin to the illusion of a glass which is half full
or half empty depending upon the observer's point of view, i.e., it is unclear whether
the Court was merely promulgating a specific exception to the estoppel doctrine or was
actually repudiating the estoppel rule. See 326 U.S. 264 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The broad language of the majority opinion cogently supports the latter view and re-
flects an overriding federal policy against the unwarranted protection of ideas unqual-
ified for patent protection:
It follows that the patent laws preclude the petitioner assignee from invok-
ing the doctrine of estoppel, as a means of continuing as against . . . his
assignor the benefit of an expired monopoly, and they preclude the assignor
from estopping himself from enjoying rights which it is the policy of the pa-
tent laws to free from all restrictions. For no more than private contract
can estoppel be the means of successfully avoiding the requirements of legisla-
tion enacted for the protection of a public interest. ... The interest in private
good faith is not a universal touchstone which can be made the means of
sacrificing a public interest secured by an appropriate exercise of legislative
power. Id. at 257.
However, in an effort to dispel any doubts as to the status of the estoppel doctrine,
the Court subsequently upheld it in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); see text accompanying note 24 supra. See also Cooper,
supra note 3, at 1151-52.
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antitrust laws. 9 To the Lear Court, it was evident that subsequent
cases had gradually sapped the vitality of the estoppel doctrine.3"
Entwined with the historical justification were the theoretical
and practical arguments for overruling licensee estoppel. The
Court concluded that the contractual basis of the estoppel rule,
though conceptually sound apart from other considerations, never-
theless conflicted with both the spirit of contract law and the na-
tional policies of patent law. Admittedly, a licensee may receive
sufficient benefits in using a patent, regardless of its validity, to
require enforcement of the agreement in accordance with the letter
of contract law.31 However, the Court placed overriding emphasis
on the need to measure commercial dealings by a "standard of good
faith."- For example, the rule ought not to prevent a licensee from
2 9 In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), a licensor sought
to recover royalties and to enforce price-fixing provisions under a license agreement.
However, the antitrust laws prohibit enforcement of unlawful price-fixing provisions
unless protected by a legal patent monopoly. Compare United States v. General Elec.
Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), which upheld price-fixing limitations in a patent license,
with United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), and United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), which found that under the particu-
lar fact drcumstances the price limitations in a group of patent licensing agreements
were an unreasonable restraint on trade and in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
In following the public policy expressed in the antitrust laws, the Sola Court held
that it was necessary to determine the validity of the patent before the validity of the
price-fixing provisions could be determined.
A further blow to the estoppel doctrine was dealt by Edward Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947), and MacGregor v. Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 853 (1947), which involved
licensing agreements containing price-fixing provisions. Unlike Sola, the licensor in
neither of these cases attempted to enforce the price-fixing agreement. Nevertheless,
finding the potentially illegal price-fixing provisions to be inseparable from the royalty
obligations, the Court held that the validity of the patent could be challenged. On the
basis of these deisions, where licensing agreements contain provisions possibly illegal
under the antitrust laws, the estoppel rule is inapplicable.
For a discussion of the relationship between antitrust and patent law, see Austern,
Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASIL L.
REV. 1015 (1965); Kadish, Patents and Antitrust: Guides and Caveats, 13 PAT., T.M.,
& COPYRIGHT J. OF RES. & EDUC. 83 (1969); Siegel, Patent Monopoly and Sherman
Act Monopolization, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 67 (1967).
30A review of these authorities alone led Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for a unani-
mons Court, to remark: "the estoppel doctrine had been so eroded that it could no
longer be considered the 'general rule.'" 395 U.S. at 664. This inclusion of a series of
cases creating numerous exceptions to the overruled principle is a favorite technique
utilized by the Court to emphasize that its derision is not the xesult of a sudden shift
in judicial philosophy. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling,
in THE SuPREmE COURT RVEW, 1963, 211, 223-26 (P. Kurland ed. 1963). But see
Dobbs, supra note 5, at 628, where Mr. Dobbs asserts that the Court's holdings repre-
sented "substantial departures from what were considered to be long-established prin-
ciples of Patent Law." Id.
31 See notes 16, 18 supra & accompanying text.
32 395 U.S. at 669. But see Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249
1970]
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voiding the contract by proving fraud." Moreover, since patents
are most often granted in ex parte administrative proceedings, it
seemed unfair to deny a licensee the opportunity to challenge a pat-
ent in an adversary context.
The most compelling argument for granting to Lear extensive
relief follows from the Court's premise that the maintenance of free
competition in the use of ideas in the public domain outweighs the
private equities of the estoppel doctrine. Any social benefits that
emanate from preserving the integrity of contract agreements must
be subordinated to the broad objectives of federal policy. To up-
hold a doctrine which sustains the sanctity of contracts would ef-
fectively deny a licensee, and the public, the free use of ideas
which are not patentable or are unpatented. In essence, federal
policy dictates the overruling of the estoppel doctrine.
Presumably, federal policy would not have been completely vin-
dicated solely by laying to rest the licensee estoppel doctrine. Free
competition of ideas can only be fully realized if the right to chal-
lenge the validity of a patent is in fact exercised. To encourage
this, the Court further held that a licensee could suspend royalty
payments while litigating a patent's validity. 4  A suspension of
royalty payments during litigation enhances the economic rewards
to a licensee. Having the most to gain economically in defeating a
patent, a licensee could perform a vital service by unshackling the
public from the burdens of worthless patents.35  Moreover, contin-
ued enforcement of the royalty obligation would give the licensor
an economic incentive to delay a final adjudication of a patent's
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (standard of good faith is the rationale for the
estoppel rule in order to secure the relations between parties to the contract).
33 That a patent was obtained by fraud from the Patent Office may be asserted in a
suit for infringement. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806, 820 (1945);
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1951) (in an action for de-
claratory judgment, where the patentee has first threatened the alleged infringer);
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-78
(1965) (in an action under the antitrust laws). See Note, Patents - The Assertion of
A Fraud Upon The Patent Office As A Means Of Defeating The Patent Monopoly,
13 N.Y.L.F. 325 (1967).
34 Ruling that Lear could stop royalties the moment it instituted a challenge di-
rectly obviated the contractual provision that allowed Lear to discontinue royalties upon
invalidation of the patent. See note 8 supra. That the Court is willing to void a
provision of the contract would seemingly undercut the force of the contractual argu-
ments for overruling the estoppel doctrine. When the two rationales for burying the
estoppel rule - the spirit of contract law and federal patent policy - are balanced
against each other, the latter clearly prevails.
a5 Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968),
illustrating the Court's reluctance in antitrust cases to invoke "broad common-law bar-
riers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes." Id. at 138.
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validity. Finally, on a more conceptual level, enforcing royalties
for the use of ideas which may already be in the public domain (be-
cause the idea is retroactively deemed unpatentable) would create
an anomaly, for no one has a right to sell ideas that belong to the
public.
The immediate beneficiary of the change wrought by Lear is the
patent licensee. It is clear that he may raise the invalidity of a pat-
ent as a defense in an action to enforce a royalty agreement. Li-
censees no longer need follow a circuitous pathway, paved by
numerous exceptions to the estoppel rule, to attack patent validity.
However, in laying to rest the licensee estoppel doctrine, the Court
has raised a spectre of uncertainty to haunt both the judiciary and
the business world.
Conceivably, the Lear holding is equally applicable to assignor
estoppel. The estoppel doctrine has been applied to assignment
contracts for much the same reasons that it has been applied to
licensing agreements.36 Assuming that federal policy overrides the
equity notions of contract law which the estoppel doctrine sought to
preserve, the law should not discriminate between licensees and as-
signors. The implication of Lear seems dear enough. Federal
policy is frustrated when even a select few, namely, the licensees,
are deprived of the free use of ideas which are in the public domain.
This national interest is no less impeded where estoppel is imposed
upon assignors to achieve the same effect.
The Court's suspension of the royalties pending a determina-
tion of patent validity poses a potential problem. In Lear, the li-
censee had paid no royalties between the issuance of the patent and
Lear's challenge of its validity in the trial court. But if royalties
had been paid prior to such attack, it is arguable that a subsequent
invalidation of the patent would have required the licensor to refund
royalties to the licensee.3 7  At least this suggestion is the logical ex-
36 Since the assignor receives valuable consideration for an interest in his patent,
it has been held inequitable to allow him to prove the speciousness of his patent. For
a discussion of assignor estoppel, see note 27 supra. In reviewing the historical demise
of the estoppel rule, Mr. Justice Harlan glossed over any distinction between licensee
and assignor estoppel. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,
266 U.S. 342 (1924), and Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945),
were cited by the Court for having undermined the very basis for the licensee estoppel
doctrine, yet the issue in those cases was whether an assignor could be estopped from chal-
lenging patent validity.
3 7 See Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933). The
court of appeals held that a licensee was not entitled to recover royalties paid before a
patent was adjudged invalid; the licensee, however, had based his request for relief on a
contract principle, mistake of fact, not on the mandates of federal policy.
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tension of the royalty obligation. One basis for the cessation of
royalty payments is essentially pragmatic - to increase a licensee's
economic incentive to discredit a patent. Another reason is more
theoretical. A licensee has a right to the free use of ideas that are
in the public domain; to require a licensee to pay for this use under-
mines federal policy. That a possible recovery of royalties from
the licensor will multiply a licensee's incentive goes without saying.
As for the precepts of federal policy, a patentee is not entitled to
receive from a licensee compensation for ideas that belong to the
public. Any royalties collected in derogation of patent policy are, in
effect, consideration for an illegal contract and, therefore, ought to
be rescindable. The Lear Court evinced no qualms over barring
enforcement of an express term of a license contract . 8  To further
free competition of unpatented and unpatentable ideas, it may not
hesitate in the future to void the entire contract.39
The likelihood that patent policy may preclude enforcement of
the entire agreement is not idle speculation. Indeed, the Court
specifically raised this issue with respect to the royalties accruing
before the issuance of Adkins' patent ° but abstained from deciding
the question.41 Mr. Justice Harlan anticipated that the policies an-
nounced in Lear may have a revolutionary impact upon the con-
38 See notes 8 & 34 supra.
39 Abrogating an entire licensing contract would, of course, free the licensee from all
royalty obligations and would, in a sense, restore him to his former status as a member
of the general public.
40 The question was: "[:WIhether and to what extent, States may protect the owners
of unpatented inventions who are willing to disclose their ideas to manufacturers only
upon payment of royalties." 395 U.S. at 674. Historically, state courts have enforced
royalties accrued on unpatented inventions. See, e.g., Acme Chair & Metal Crafts Co.
v. Northern Corrugating Co., 209 Wis. 8, 244 N.W. 582 (1932) (licensee compelled
to pay royalties on unpatented device many features of which are not covered by exist-
ing patents); Myers v. Gerhardt, 344 Ill. 620, 176 N.E. 713 (1931) (licensor able to re-
cover royalties on an invention whose patent is subsequently declared invalid); Hamilton
v. Park & McKay Co., 112 Mich. 138, 70 N.W. 436 (1897); Ingraham v. Schaum &
Uhlinger, 157 Pa. 88, 27 A. 404 (1893) (royalties enforceable with respect to inven-
tion whose patent application is subsequently refused). See also Gesing v. Grand Rap-
ids Hardware Co., 362 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1966) (licensee obligated to pay royalties
due on series of locks which are described in the patent application, but not included in
the patent grant).
4 1 The Court was not in any position to render a decision on the issue of prepatent
royalty enforcement since the question had neither been briefed nor argued. However,
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, dis-
sented from even reserving this question for future decision. They concluded that
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), had already settled the question implicitly by
holding that no state has the right to authorize any kind of monopoly on unpatented in-
ventions; private agreements by which inventors disclose their discoveries for payments
,run counter to the plan of our patent system." 395 U.S. at 677.
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tractual rights of the inventor. Given the complexity of possibly
revamping the law of 50 jurisdictions, the states, not the Court,
should first attempt to reconcile their present laws with federal pat-
ent policy. Thus, the Court directed the California Supreme Court
to definitely consider the question of prepatent royalties if it should
find the Adkins' patent invalid.42
Assuming, arguendo, that the patent is invalid, the California
court will have to reassess the contractual rights of the inventor in a
manner consistent with federal policy as explicated in Lear. Of
course, no one can predict what that court will decide. However,
there are at least four alternatives. First, it could rule that Lear is
obligated to pay for royalties due prior to the issuance of the patent
in 1960. To reach this conclusion the court would have to deter-
mine that federal patent policy is not significantly frustrated where
the licensee is willing to bargain for ideas that are not readily avail-
able to it and to which immediate access will prove highly profit-
able, especially in gaining an economic edge over competitors. Sec-
ond, Adkins may be entitled to royalties, but to a lesser amount
than the sum stipulated in the contract. In that case, the court will
have to arbitrarily set an amount that reasonably compensates the
inventor for his time and money spent in realizing his ideas. Third,
the California court could simply hold that federal policy pre-
cludes Adkins from collecting any royalties for ideas which are ulti-
mately found to be unpatentable. Finally, as an extension of the
third alternative, the court could decide that Lear is not only re-
leased from its royalty obligations but is also entitled to a refund.
Whatever result the California court fashions, its decision may well
prove the model for other courts to follow.
On the other hand, if the California court finds that Adkins'
patent was valid, it will be spared the contract problem, at least for
the present. But this will not diminish the impact of Lear. Any
other state court confronted with a similar fact situation will uin-
doubtedly find licensees invoking the forceful commands of Lear.
If the state courts should collectively fail to reconcile the compet-
ing demands of state contract and federal patent law, the Supreme
Court will probably have no choice but to decide the question itself,
42 395 U.S. at 675. The Court has in effect applied the abstention dictrine to avoid
decision of a federal constitutional question where questions of state law may be dis-
positive of the case. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1963). However, this
case is unique in that Lear did not even raise a federal question concerning the pre-
patent royalties. In raising the issue itself, the Court probably wanted to alert state
courts and to exert subtle pressure on them to directly resolve, without sidestepping,
the possible conflict between state and federal law.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 279
with the risk of handing down a broad rule which does not ade-
quately resolve the unique problems arising from the particular
laws of the several states.
The reverberations of Lear may well extend beyond federal pat-
ent policy and state contract law. Conceivably, Lear could spur a
reexamination of the state law of trade secrets and its protection
against both the deliberate and the inadvertent misappropriation of
unpatented, secret ideas.43  One of the principal justifications ad-
vanced in support of trade secret law is that it maintains commer-
cial morality among competitors and between manufacturers and
inventors who disclose their ideas to the former in anticipation of
making a sale.4 The practical ramifications of trade secret law are
twofold. First, it enables an inventor or a business to keep its
unpatented ideas secret for a potentially unlimited duration. Sec-
ond, unlike patent law, it offers protection for the commercial ex-
ploitation of the secret ideas without the necessity of public disclo-
sure. 5  These implications are in problematical conflict with the
dual objectives of patent law - the disclosure and the free circula-
tion of unpatented and unpatentable ideas. The question arises
whether the policies and justifications underlying trade secret law
outweigh the policies of federal patent law. Commentators have
43 A trade secret has been broadly defined as:
[Alny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving mate-
rials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 2 (1939).
Although a trade secret may leak into the hands of competitors in a variety of circum-
stances, the problem usually arises within the context of the employment relationship.
An employer will disclose confidential information to an employee who subsequently
leaves either to organize a competing business or to join a competitor. Absent legal
sanctions, there is nothing to restrain the employee from using the secret to under-
mine the former employer's competitive advantage. See Doerfer, Limits on Trade
Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. I. REV.
1432, 1435-38 (1967).
Mr. Justice Harlan states very broadly that the Lear case includes "the difficult
question of whether federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a contract regulat-
ing access to an unpatented secret idea." 395 U.S. at 672. He footnotes this statement
with references to several articles which discuss the relation of trade secret law to fed-
eral patent law. Id. at 672 n.18. Coming within this description of contracts are
those employment contracts in which the employee agrees not to divulge nor use any
trade secrets disclosed by the employer if the former should leave the company. See
generally R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS ch. 14 (Supp.
1965); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS (1953).
44 Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire - A Proposed Federal Solution, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1966).
4 Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-Emption - The Aftermath of Sears
and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 713, 714-15 (1967).
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generally concluded that state trade secret law actually complements
patent law and promotes the development of new inventions.46 But
the Lear decision has kindled a fear among members of the patent
profession that the Supreme Court will eventually hold that under
the Supremacy Clause47 federal law preempts state protection of un-
patented inventions.48  Given its large role in governing today's
business relations, any nullification of trade secret law should be
effected only if it is found that its threat to free competition does in
fact overshadow the sum of its social and economic benefits.
Aside from the legal ramifications of the Court's holding, there
is the economic question of the effect the decision will have upon
existing business relations. This question assumes even greater
significance because the abrogation of the estoppel doctrine wrought
by Lear applies to contracts already in force at the announcement
of the decision as well as to contracts to be formed in futuro. De-
spite respondent's warnings to the contrary,49 the Lear majority con-
cluded that existing business relationships would not be under-
mined, partly because of the already existing ease with which the
estoppel doctrine can be circumvented. 50 However, it may reason-
ably be predicted that a number of licensees will rely on the high
mortality rate of patents scrutinized in the courts.51 Even if a i-
censee does not actually challenge the underlying patent, the Lear
decision places him in a much stronger bargaining position with
respect to contracts subject to renewal. The mere threat of throw-
4 6 See Doerfer, supra note 43, at 1454.
47 U.S. CONST. art. VI, . 2.
48 Letter from Tom Arnold, Chairman of the National Council of Patent Law As-
sociations (NCPLA), to NC.PLA Delegates, June 23, 1969. In light of the Lear deci-
sion, Mr. Arnold urged that a new dause be grafted onto the proposed new patent
statute: 'This (title) shall not be construed to preempt or itself to affect, state or other
federal law relating to inventions not protected by this title, or to preempt or itself af-
fect either trade secret law, contract law relating to trade secrets, or other unfair compe-
tition law." Id.
49 Brief for Respondent at 76, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
50 395 U.S. at 674 n.19.
51 Between 1960 and 1963, 53.7 percent of the patents litigated in the United
States Courts of Appeals were held invalid. Wood, An Appraisal of Recent Cases
Respecting Patents and Anti-Trust Laws, 21 BUS. IAwYER 999 (1966). See Mayers,
The United States Patent System in Historical Perspective, 3 PAT., T.M., & COPYRIGHT
J. OF M S. & EDUC. 33, 50-51 (1959), wherein Mr. Mayers theorized:
In periods of dissatisfaction with the functioning of business as a supplier of
reasonably priced goods, popular sentiment has tended to demand curtail-
ment of its special franchises, rewards, and prerequisites. Sensitivity of
judges to these tides of general opinion has been reflected in variances in the
severity of their attitude toward patent claimants.
Thus, in this period of rapidly increasing prices, one would have some basis for
predicting an upward trend in the finding of patent invalidity.
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